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Abstract
The present study investigated why it is that the more concrete the
subject noun phrase of a sentence, the more likely the predicate is to be
recalled when the subject noun phrase is the cue. The findings were that
concretization dramatically influences both the probability of recognition
of the subject noun phrase and the probability of recall of the predicate
given recognition. These results were taken to mean that a concrete phrase
makes a good conceptual peg because it is likely to be given a specific,
stable encoding and because it tends to redintegrate the whole sentence.
Regression analysis showed that the concreteness effect could not be attri-
buted to an influence on comprehensibility. A model of sentence memory is
offered which can account for the results.
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Two Faces of the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis
It is well known that concrete language makes word pairs and sentences
more memorable. The most widely accepted explanation for this fact is that
concrete words readily form integrated, holistic units, often conceived to
take the form of mental images (cf. Paivio, 1971). Several lines of evi-
dence support the hypothesis that it is the holistic character of the mental
representations to which concrete words and concretizing operations give
rise that accounts for their facilitative effect. For example, Begg (1972)
compared cued recall and free recall of noun phrases. He found that when
both the adjective and noun were concrete, such as in rusty engine, cued
recall of either phrase constituent using the other word as the cue was
much better than free recall. For phrases composed of abstract adjectives
and nouns, such as absolute truth, cued recall was no better than free recall.
When subjects do not spontaneously construct unified representations--
or conditions are contrived to work against such organization--imagery
instructions, pictures, drawings, and concrete words lose their potency.
Experiments comparing separate pictures with pictures integrating the stimu-
lus and response elements into a single scene invariably show a distinct
advantage for the composite pictures (Epstein, Rock, & Zuckerman, 1960;
Davidson, 1964; Reese, 1965). Bower (1972) found that subjects asked to
bring to mind a scene of two objects interacting in some way recalled sub-
stantially more than subjects told "to imagine the two objects one at a
time in their imaginal space, like two pictures being seen on opposite walls
of a room." Finally, Rohwer (1967) found that placing a verb or a preposition
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between two concrete nouns (the rock breaks the bottle, the rock behind the
bottle) facilitated learning whereas connecting them with a conjunction
(the rock and the bottle) did not. In summary, there is a quite convincing
case that it is the quality of being easily organized into unified mental
representations which accounts for the advantage of concrete elements.
A very different interpretation of the concreteness effect can be de-
rived from the encoding variability hypothesis of Martin (1968) and the com-
plementary concept of encoding specificity (cf. Tulving & Thompson, 1973).
Martin has developed a two-stage model of cued recall performance. According
to this model, when the cue is presented it must make contact with the
representation of the cue stored during study. Next the response must be
accessed from this stored representation. The first stage will succeed
only when the cue is given the same encoding at the test as it was during
study. If the two encodings fail to match, recall can not occur. It stands
to reason that a concrete, denotatively specific term will permit fewer
encodings than an abstract term. Consequently, concreteness could increase
the probability that the encodings of the cue at test and study will match
rather than the likelihood of an integrated representation.
It would appear, then, that there are at least two versions of the
"conceptual peg" hypothesis (Paivio, 1969, 1972). The one which Paivio
favors is that the concrete cue is more likely to evoke the whole idea,
that is, that it has greater "redintegrative power" (Horowitz & Prytulak,
1969). But a plausible alternative is that concrete stimuli are more recog-
nizable than abstract stimuli because there is a higher probability that
they will have been given specific, stable encodings.
Conceptual Peg Hypothesis
4
To date, the only direct experimental tests of these two explanations
for the effects of concreteness have been completed by Wicker and his
associates (Wicker, 1970; Wicker & Evertson, 1972), who have investigated
picture-word differences using a paired associate task. Drawings or con-
crete nouns representing the same common objects were, respectively, the
concrete and less concrete stimuli; A combined recognition and recall test
included new drawings and words to serve as distractors. For each item,
the subject indicated whether it was old or new and, if judged old, attemp-
ted to give the response element. These experiments have consistently shown
better recognition of pictures than words, suggesting less encoding vari-
ability of the more concrete stimulus. However, no differences in recall
conditional upon recognition have appeared, a fact inconsistent with the
redintegration hypothesis. Hence, the results appear to differentially
support the encoding specificity interpretation of the concreteness effect.
There are at least two reasons for not accepting Wicker's results at
face value, however. First, like many other experiments of this general
type (cf. Martin, 1967), it can be argued that recognition was confounded
with capacity to recall. When a subject judged a cue to be old, he was
immediately thereafter expected to produce a response. This task demand
may have caused the criterion for saying "old" to shift depending upon
whether a response was available. If this happened, of course, the data
would give the appearance of locating the concreteness effect in the recog-
nition phase even though it was really due to redintegration. In the experi-
ment reported here, the recognition test preceded and was completely sep-
arate from the recall test. While response availability may still have
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affected the old/new judgement, at least gross confounding was avoided; our
procedures did not invite a recognition strategy based on whether or not
the rest of the configuration could be recalled.
There is a second reason for not counting Wicker's data too heavily
against the redintegration hypothesis. His pairs were completely arbitrary,
and arbitrary concantenations do not necessarily form units (Horowitz &
Prytulak, 1969). Redintegration depends upon there being holistic images
(Begg, 1972) or, perhaps, unified propositions (Kintsch, 1974) so that there
is something to be redintegrated.
The present experiment employed meaningful sentence pairs of the kind
used by Anderson (1974). One sentence in each pair contained a concretely-
modified subject noun phrase, the other a redundantly-modified subject noun
phrase. Below are some examples:
The traditional customs fascinated the tourists.
The tribal marriage customs fascinated the tourists.
The parking regulations annoyed the salesman.
The official regulations annoyed the salesman.
The set of official regulations, for instance, is not much smaller
than the set of all regulations, whereas parking regulations are a distinctly
smaller subset. In other words, the concrete phrases were more denotatively
specific than the redundant ones. Anderson (Experiment II) found that sub-
jects were about one-and-one-half times as likely to recall the predicates
of sentences which began with concrete than redundant subject noun phrases,
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given the subject noun phrases as cues. The purpose of the experiment
described herein was to determine whether the advantage of the concrete
phrases can be attributed to their superior recognizability or their capac-
ity to redintegrate whole ideas.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 77 male and female undergraduates enrolled
in introductory educational psychology, who participated to fulfill a course
requirement. A total of 118 additional subjects from the same population
took part in studies to norm the materials.
Materials. Forty pairs of sentences of the type already illustrated
were constructed. Both members of any pair were identical save for the
concrete or redundant adjective preceding the subject noun. The subject
nouns were abstract or general terms. (A preliminary experiment showed that
concrete modifiers have little impact when the subject noun is a specific,
concrete term.) The predicates contained familiar, concrete words. The
sentences were written to be readily understandable no matter which adjec-
tive was used.
Every sentence was rated on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 meant very
hard to understand and 7 meant very easy to understand. Each of two groups
of 20 subjects saw 20 concrete and 20 redundant sentences. There were two
counterbalanced lists such that sentences which were concrete for one group
were redundant for the other. The reliability of the comprehensibility
ratings, estimated using an analysis of variance procedure, was .91.
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A total of 78 subjects rated the subject noun phrases for similarity
to a set of distractors. Subjects received a mimeographed booklet con-
taining 10 concrete and 10 redundant noun phrases. Also provided was a
sheet listing 10 concrete and 10 redundant distractor phrases. Which set
of phrases was the distractor set and which the target set was counter-
balanced. For each phrase in the booklet the subject was to select the
distractor item which was most similar in meaning, and then rate the simi-
larity of this distractor and the target phrase on a seven-point scale where
1 meant very different in meaning and 7 meant very similar in meaning. The
reliability of the similarity ratings was .79.
Design. The variable of interest was type of modifier, concrete or
redundant. Sentence set and list were two additional variables required
for counterbalancing. The forty sentence pairs were divided into two sets
in a manner the experimenters judged would minimize intraset intrusions.
Each set was partitioned into complementary lists containing one sentence
from each pair, of which 10 were concrete and 10 redundant. Finally, the
lists were divided into two blocks. Block order was counterbalanced. The
order of items within blocks during study and the two tests was random,
but on each occasion the block order was the same. Blocking was one of the
procedures employed to minimize recall from short-term, nonsemantic memory.
In this design, sentence set and list were between-subjects factors; modi-
fier type and block position were within-subjects factors.
Procedure. The sentences were presented to groups of subjects in
mimeographed booklets, one sentence per page. There were eight different
random orders of items within blocks in the study booklet. The subjects
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were given 10 seconds to study each sentence, paced by tape recorded "beeps."
A filler task, to further reduce recall from short-term memory, the Surface
Development Test (French, Ekstrom, & Price, 1963), was administered for
five minutes after the study trial. Next came a successive recognition
task. The 20 target and 20 distractor items were intermixed in a mimeo-
graphed booklet, one phrase per page, in a total of eight different random
orders within block. The distractor items for any one group were the target
items for subjects who had received another set and list. In addition to
circling "old" or "new" for each item, subjects rated confidence on a scale
from 1 (just guessing) to 5 (completely certain I'm right).
The final task was an unannounced recall test, which consisted of a
booklet with one subject noun phrase per page. There were eight different
random orders of phrases within blocks. The booklet contained only phrases
from the study list, which was a fact subjects were told. The instructions
emphasized that while a subject should try to recall each sentence verbatim,
"if you do not remember the exact words of the sentence, but do remember
the meaning, write down a sentence as close to the original as possible."
Both the recognition and recall tests were subject paced.
Results
Recognition. Table 1 presents several measures of recognition per-
formance. Minimum quasi F ratios calculated for hits, false alarms, and
corrected recognition all showed significant (a = .01 for these and all
other tests reported in this paper) effects for type of modifier. For
instance, for the corrected recognition measure, min F'(1,81) = 34.2.
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There were neither main effects or interactions involving set, list, or
block position. The old/new data were pooled to obtain the d' and log 8
values which appear in Table 1. A more elaborate signal detection analysis
is presented later.
Insert Table 1 about here
Recall. The mean proportions recalled at four levels of scoring appear
in Table 2. Level I entailed a verbatim reproduction except for abbrevia-
tions and contractions. Level II scoring was also verbatim, but permitted
changes of articles, auxiliaries, number, tense, and meaning-preserving
changes of prepositions and word order. Level III allowed substitution of
synonyms, hyponyms, close superordinates, and close cohyponyms for the sub-
stantive words of the original. At Level IV the reproduction was unmistak-
ably derived from the presented sentence, but the meaning was distorted in
some way. The score at any level included all sentences which were counted
correct at preceding levels. In previous research using this scoring scheme,
raters have proved very reliable (Anderson & Ortony, 1975).
Type of modifier had a significant effect on recall no matter what the
level of scoring. At Level III, which is gist or substance recall,
min F'(1,79) = 31.2. There were no main or interaction effects involving
set, list, or block position.
Insert Table 2 about here
Conditional recall. In Table 3 are mean proportions recalled given
recognition. Once again, type of modifier was significant at every level
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of scoring. For conditional substance recall, min F'(1,81) = 25.8. As in
every other set of analyses, there were no effects due to set, list, or
block position.
Insert Table 3 about here
Similarity and comprehensibility. The concrete and redundant phrases
were rated equally discriminable from the distractors, t(39) = .66. How-
ever, the sentences containing concrete adjectives were judged signifi-
cantly more comprehensible than the parallel sentences containing redundant
adjectives, t(39) = 5.35.
The correlations of similarity rating, comprehensibility rating, and
modifier concreteness with corrected recognition were -.16, .09, and .53,
respectively. The multiple correlation was just .56, so it is apparent
that most of the variance was due to concreteness.
Similarity, comprehensibility, and concreteness correlated .03, .33,
and .48 with conditional substance (Level III) recall. The multiple corre-
lation was .50. Only modifier concreteness had a significant regression
coefficient. Approaching the matter in another way, there was still a
significant correlation between concreteness and conditional recall when
comprehensibility was partialed out.
Discussion
The present experiment provides evidence consistent with both the
recognizability and the redintegration interpretations of the concreteness
effect. Subjects were much better at recognizing the concrete noun phrases
Conceptual Peg Hypothesis
11
than the redundant noun phrases. That this difference was not due to the
failure to provide comparable distractor sets is suggested by the similarity
rating data. As Wicker (1970) has previously argued a compelling explana-
tion of the superior recognizability of concrete items is that they give
rise to specific encodings. A concrete noun phrase refers to a narrower
range of things than a redundant noun phrase. There is less latitude for
variable encoding on different occasions.
The new finding in this research was the substantially higher level
of recall given recognition for the sentences containing concrete adjec-
tives compared to the ones containing redundant adjectives. A question
might be raised about the conditional recall proportions since subjects had
a looser criterion for calling redundant phrases "old." This fact probably
led to an underestimate of the amount recalled given recognition, because
the number of redundant phrases identified as old was larger than the number
truly recognized, or at least there was a bias in that direction relative
to the concrete phrases. Below we consider a model which discounts the
effects of bias. In the mean time, note that the most conservative possible
assumption is that for every false alarm there was a lucky hit. When con-
ditional proportions are calculated dividing by hits minus false alarms
instead of simply hits, there is still a substantial, significant difference
favoring the concrete items, F(1,73) = 13.2. Thus, criterion bias cannot
explain the difference in recall given recognition.
Next we will present a model which permits a more detailed analysis
of the effects of modifier type. It is similar to the one suggested for
a different paradigm by Bernbach and Kupchak (1972), and it borrows from
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signal detection theory (Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961). For ease of
exposition, just the case in which the subject noun phrase is the cue and
the predicate is the response, the arrangement in this experiment, will be
discussed.
Assume that a certain proportion, s, of the presented sentences enter
a stored state, S, while the rest remain in an unstored state, N. It is
important to note that State N effectively includes sentences whose sub-
ject noun phrases are encoded differently at time of initial presentation
and time of test, as well as sentences which are not stored at all. The
predicates of sentences in State N are never recalled, and the subject noun
phrases from these sentences are indistinguishable from distractors. On
the other hand, a certain proportion, r, of the predicates from sentences
in State S are recalled, and the subject noun phrases from sentences in
State S can be distinguished from distractors to some extent as being "old."
The efficiency of this recognition process together with the probabilities
s and r, constitute the parameters of the model, all of which may be esti-
mated from the data at hand.
Consider the process by which people distinguish the subject noun
phrases of sentences in State S from the distractors. Since all sentences
whose predicates are recalled must be in State S, the ROC (relative opera-
ting characteristic) for recalled items alone appropriately represents the
process. To construct this ROC, we derived a score, C, for each judgement,
reflecting the extent to which the subject believed the subject noun phrase
was old. For items judged "old," C was simply the confidence rating; for
items judged "new," C was the negative of the confidence rating. Then,
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for each possible value, x, of C, we obtained the proportion of items re-
called at Scoring Level III for which C exceeded x, and the proportion of
distractors for which C exceeded x. Figure 1 shows the former values
plotted as a function of the latter on normal-normal coordinates.
Insert Figure 1 about here
According to the classical theory of signal detectability, subjects
base their judgements on the value of a random variable, X, representing
evidence that the item is old. If X is normally distributed for the dis-
tractors and items in State N, and normally distributed with the same
variance for items in State S, and if C is a nondecreasing function of X,
then the ROC plotted on normal-normal paper should be linear with a slope
of 1. Furthermore, the efficiency of the recognition process can be repre-
sented by a single parameter:
E(XJS) - (E(XIN)
d* =
XIN
Using the overall proportions of "old" responses to recalled and new items
(the points indicated with circles in Figure 1) the estimates of d* for
concrete and redundant phrases are 3.62 and 2.39, respectively. The ROCs
in Figure 1 are the ones predicted on the basis of these estimates. Sta-
tistical considerations aside, the fit of the model would appear to be
acceptable, at least in the middle confidence range.
The other two parameters of interest are s, the storage rate, and r,
the retrieval rate for stored sentences. The former parameter is reflected
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in the difference between the ROC for recalled (i.e. stored) items and
that for all presented items (both stored and not stored). Since d' =
[E(xlold) - E(XIN)]/OXIN, it is not difficult to show that d' = sd*. Di-
viding the estimates of d' given in Table 1 by the estimates of d* given
above, the estimate of s is .72 for concrete items and .62 for redundant
items. The overall probability of recall is sr, the probability that an
item will be both stored and recalled. Estimates of r can therefore be
obtained by dividing the observed recall probabilities (given in Table 2,
Column III) by the estimates of s. The resulting estimates of r are .55
for concrete items and .29 for redundant items.
Statistical evaluation of the effects of modifier type on the para-
meters of the model is quite difficult. Sample sizes were too small to
allow for parameter estimates on a subject-by-subject basis. Instead, we
used a statistical procedure described in Mosteller and Tukey (1968) known
as the "jacknife." The jacknife involves developing a pseudoestimate for
each case which reflects that case's contribution to the estimate derived
from the entire set of n cases. The pseudoestimate for the ith case is,
*i = n-all - (n- 1)x(i), where yall is the parameter estimate based on
the full set of data, and y(i) is the estimate based on the data set with
the ith case removed. (To get some intuitive feel for the behavior of these
pseudoestimates, note that the pseudoestimates are the raw scores them-
selves in the case where y is a sample mean.)
There were a few occasions where hit rates were 1 or false alarm rates
were 0. In these cases we substituted values of k/(k + 1) and l/(k + I),
respectively, k being the number of cases involved in the proportion. Such
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a procedure was necessary to obtain finite normal deviates upon which to
base estimates of d* and d'. The average pseudoestimates of d*, s, and r
for concrete items were 3.52, .75, and .52, respectively. The corresponding
averages for redundant items were 2.51, .51, and .32. Analyses of variance
showed that modifier type had a significant effect on all three variables.
Thus, assuming that the jacknife is appropriate here, the differences in
parameter estimates were not due to chance.
The calculations based on the model of sentence memory further support
the conclusions advanced earlier. The fact that s was lower for redundant
than concrete items is consistent with the notion that redundant modifiers
are more likely to be encoded variably from occasion to occasion, though
it could also mean that sentences containing redundant modifiers are less
likely to be stored at all. Especially telling is the d* difference, which
indicates that there is poorer recognition of redundant subject noun phrases
even when just those items which were recalled are considered. The one
reasonable interpretation of this fact is that redundant phrases are likely
to receive different interpretations at different times in different con-
texts. The higher mean value of r for concrete items is exactly what would
be expected from the redintegration hypothesis.
Recently, Thorndyke (1975) has reported a study which he interprets
as disconfirming the holistic integration hypothesis. He manipulated verb
imageability in simple subject-verb-object sentences and tested recall using
the subject, verb, or object as a cue. The finding was that verb image-
ability had an effect only when the verb was part of the to-be-recalled
target, not when the verb was the cue. He argued that these results are
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inconsistent with the integration hypothesis because if high imagery verbs
lead to more integrated representations, then they should be better cues.
He further argued that high imageability simply leads to better retention
of the verb itself, discrete from any effect on the rest of the sentence.
These results are, of course, exactly contrary to the striking concretiza-
tion effect observed in this study and the previous one (Anderson, 1974).
Thorndyke's study is also inconsistent with studies showing larger stimulus
than response effects in noun pair learning (cf. Paivio & Yarmey, 1966).
The contrast between Thorndyke's findings and those of other investigators
may be due to a difference in how imageability affects nouns and verbs in
sentences (cf. Yuille & Holyoak, 1974), perhaps because of the apparently
lesser role of verbs in sentence storage (cf. Bobrow, 1970). Further-
more, Thios (1974) has reported results which are the precise opposite of
Thorndyke's. Thios found that concrete verbs were better cues in a cued
recall task than more general verbs, but did not eventuate in better recall
when the subjects or objects were the cues, provided that synonyms sub-
stituted for the verbs were scored as correct. Obviously the effects of
concretizing verbs is a matter which awaits future resolution.
Johnson, Bransford, Nyberg, and Cleary (1972) and Pezdek and Royer
(1974) have argued that some, if not all, of the effects on concreteness
can be explained in terms of the greater comprehensibility of concrete
language. In the present case, though the concrete sentences were rated as
more comprehensible than the redundant sentences, the comprehensibility
ratings accounted for little variance in either recognition or conditional
recall. Thus, we must conclude that concreteness has effects apart from
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any it has on comprehensibility. This conclusion should not be pushed too
far, however, for it is obvious that concreteness will generally contribute
to comprehensibility. A sentence filled with words whose referents are
unclear is by definition vague and, therefore, less than fully comprehen-
sible. Pezdek and Royer (1974) showed that abstract sentences, such as
The foreign faith aroused an enduring interest, will be given a semantic
interpretation in an appropriate context. They are surely right that the
context was helpful because it aided comprehension. However, the reason
comprehension became more probable should not be overlooked. In the case
of the sentence about the foreign faith, the facilitative context involved
a Hindu girl talking about her religion to a class of fascinated American
students. The context improved comprehension because it provided for a
concrete instantiation of words whose referents were otherwise indetermi-
nate (cf. Anderson & McGaw, 1973).
We speak of "concrete words," but this is potentially confusing short-
hand. It is things and events which are concrete, and it is the specificity
of mental representations which relates to comprehension. So-called "con-
crete words" usually have unambiguous referents and they usually permit the
construction of instantiated mental representations, but not always. There
are sentences composed of concrete words, such as The notes were sour
because the seams split, which are incomprehensible to most people, unless
they are provided with an illuminating context, in this case one involving
bagpipes (Bransford & McCarrell, 1974). Again, the obstacle to comprehen-
sion is the difficulty in discovering what specifically the words are about.
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In conclusion, the present research suggests that there are two dis-
tinct factors which make concrete stimuli efficacious conceptual pegs.
First, concrete cues are identified with greater accuracy than abstract
cues, most probably because they tend to be encoded the same way on each
occasion. Second, concrete cues have greater power to reinstate the whole
idea than less denotatively specific cues.
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Table 1
Mean Performance on Recognition Measures
False Corrected
Type of modifier Hits alarms recognition d' log 8
Concrete .86 .08 .79 2.59 -.18
Redundant .75 .21 .54 1.48 -.04
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Table 2
Mean Proportions Recalled
Level of scoringa
Type of modifier I II III IV
Concrete .17 .19 .40 .53
Redundant .08 ..10 .19 .27
aSee text for description of scoring procedures.
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Table 3
Mean Proportions Recalled Given Recognition
a
Level of scoringa
Type of modifier I II III IV
Concrete .18 .21 .44 .59
Redundant .09 .11 .22 .32
aSee text for description of scoring procedures.
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. ROCs for recalled items plotted on normal-normal paper
as a function of modifier type. (Points indicated by circles are for
x = -1, i.e. for "old" responses.)
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